Scientific models describe natural phenomena at different levels of abstraction. Abstract descriptions can provide the basis for interventions on the system and explanation of observed phenomena at a level of granularity that is coarser than the most fundamental account of the system. Beckers and Halpern (2019), building on work of Rubenstein et al. (2017) , developed an account of abstraction for causal models that is exact. Here we extend this account to the more realistic case where an abstract causal model offers only an approximation of the underlying system. We show how the resulting account handles the discrepancy that can arise between low-and highlevel causal models of the same system, and in the process provide an account of how one causal model approximates another, a topic of independent interest. Finally, we extend the account of approximate abstractions to probabilistic causal models, indicating how and where uncertainty can enter into an approximate abstraction.
INTRODUCTION
Scientific models aim to provide a description of reality that offers both an explanation of observed phenomena and a basis for intervening on and manipulating the system to bring about desired outcomes. Both of these aims lead to a consideration of models that represent the causal relations governing the system. They also imply the need for scientific models that describe the system at a granularity or level of description appropriate for the user and suitable for interventions that are feasible. Such more abstract causal models do not capture all the Chalupka et al. (2016) , in which a high-level causal model for the phenomenon of El Niño is constructed from low-level (high-dimensional) wind W and sea surface temperature T measurements. U is an unmeasured confounder and τ is the mapping between the models. See text for details. detailed interactions that occur at the most fundamental level of the system, nor do they, in general, represent outcomes of the system completely accurately at the abstract level. Nevertheless, such abstract causal models can (at least) approximately explain the phenomena, and can be informative about how the system will respond to interventions that are specified only at the abstract level.
This paper provides a formal account of such approximate abstractions for causal models that builds on the definition of an abstraction provided by Beckers and Halpern (2019) (see Section 2), which in turn built on the work of Rubenstein et al. (2017) . That notion of abstraction implicitly assumed an underlying causal system that permitted an exact description of the system at the abstract level. Here we weaken that assumption to handle what we take to be the more realistic case, namely, that abstract causal models will capture the underlying system in only an approximate way.
As a simplified working example to illustrate our points we use the case of the wind and sea surface temper-ature patterns over the equatorial Pacific that give rise to the high-level climate phenomena of El Niño and La Niña, as described by Chalupka et al. (2016) . They considered the question of how the El Niño climate phenomenon related to the underlying wind and sea surface temperature patterns that constitute it (see Fig. 1 ). At the low level they considered two high-dimensional vectorvalued variables representing the wind speeds W and the sea surface temperatures T , respectively, on a grid of geographical locations in the equatorial Pacific. They assumed (with some justification from climate science) that wind speed W is a cause of sea surface temperature T , that is, T = f L ( W , U ) for some high-dimensional function f L (.) and exogenous causes U . They allowed the possibility that U may be a confounder of W and T , so that there might be an additional causal relation W = g L ( U ). Leaving details about feedback and temporal delay aside, they were interested in whether the same system could be described at a higher level, using a low-dimensional structural equation E = f H (C, U ), where there is a surjective mapping τ from R( T , W ), the set of possible values of T and W , to R(E, C). In the language of this paper, they were searching for an abstract causal description of the system. They required that the high-level model retain a causal interpretation, in the sense that if one intervened on C, there would still be a well-defined causal effect on E, no matter how the intervention on C was interpreted as an intervention on the underlying set of variables W . Chalupka et al. (2016) were able to learn such a highlevel model, and one of the states of E (the high-level description of the sea surface temperatures) indeed corresponded to what would commonly be described as an El Niño occurring, conventionally defined by an average temperature deviation in a rectangular region of the Pacific. However, the high-level description was not perfect: it provided an informative causal description of the underlying systems and allowed for predictions that approximated the actual outcomes. Here we make precise the nature of such an approximation between a high-level and low-level causal model of the same system. In the process, we define what it means for one causal model to approximate another.
Although our running example is a vastly simplified climate model, the challenge of approximately modeling phenomena at a more abstract level is part of almost every scientific model. For example, it was Robert Boyle's great insight that, despite its inaccuracies for real gases in practice, the ideal gas law still provides an approximate abstract description of the behavior of the molecules of a gas in a container that is extraordinarily useful for understanding and manipulating real systems. Approximate abstractions can take a variety of forms in scientific practice, ranging from idealizations and discretizations to other forms of simplification and dimension reduction (as in the climate example). Our account captures these in a unified formal framework.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a framework that offers a foundation for analyzing abstraction and approximation in causal models. We provide what we believe are sensible definitions of approximation and approximate abstraction, and a conceptual discussion of these notions. In addition, we provide some technical results regarding the difficulty of determining whether an approximate abstraction can be viewed as the composition of an approximation and an exact abstraction.
PRELIMINARIES
Since we are interested in scientific models that support explanations of phenomena and can inform interventions on a system, we start by defining a deterministic causal model with a set of possible interventions. We use exogenous and endogenous variables to distinguish those influences that are external to the system and those that are internal. The definitions follow the framework developed by Halpern (2016) . Definition 2.1: A signature S is a tuple (U, V, R), where U is a set of exogenous variables, V is a set of endogenous variables, and R, a function that associates with every variable Y ∈ U ∪V a nonempty set R(Y ) of possible values for Y (i.e., the set of values over which Y ranges).
For simplicity in this paper, we assume that signatures are finite, that is, U and V are finite, and the range of each variable Y ∈ U ∪ V is finite. Definition 2.2: A basic causal model M is a pair (S, F), where S is a signature and F defines a function that associates with each endogenous variable X a structural equation F X giving the value of X in terms of the values of other endogenous and exogenous variables. Formally, the equation F X maps R(U ∪ V − {X}) to R(X), so F X determines the value of X, given the values of all the other variables in U ∪ V.
Note that there are no functions associated with exogenous variables, since their values are determined outside the model. We call a setting u of values of exogenous variables a context. The value of X may not depend on the values of all other variables. Y depends on X in context u if there is some setting of the endogenous variables other than X and Y such that if the exogenous variables have value u, then varying the value of X in that context results in a variation in the value of Y ; that is, there is a setting z of the endogenous variables other than X and Y and values x and x of X such that F Y (x, z, u) = F Y (x , z, u).
In this paper, we restrict attention to recursive (or acyclic) models, that is, models where there is a partial order on variables such that if Y depends on X, then X ≺ Y .
2 In a recursive model, given a context u, the values of all the remaining variables are determined (we can just solve for the value of the endogenous variables in the order given by ≺) We often write the equation for an endogenous variable as X = f ( Y ); this denotes that the value of X depends only on the values of the variables in Y , and the connection is given by f . Our climate example is recursive, since T = f L ( W , U ).
An intervention has the form X ← x, where X is a set of endogenous variables. Intuitively, this means that the values of the variables in X are set to x. The structural equations define what happens in the presence of interventions. Setting the value of some variables X to x in a causal model M = (S, F) results in a new causal model, denoted M X← x , which is identical to M , except that F is replaced by F X← x : for each variable Y / ∈ X, F X← x Y = F Y (i.e., the equation for Y is unchanged), while for each X in X, the equation F X for is replaced by X = x (where x is the value in x corresponding to x). Halpern and Pearl (2005) and Halpern (2016) implicitly assumed that all interventions can be performed in a model. For reasons that will become clear when defining abstraction, we follow Rubenstein et al. (2017) and Beckers and Halpern (2019) in adding the notion of "allowed interventions" to a causal model. This allows us to capture situations where not all interventions are of interest to the modeler and/or some interventions may not be feasible. We can then define a causal model M as a tuple (S, F, I), where (S, F) is a basic causal model and I is a set of allowed interventions. We sometimes write a causal model M = (S, F, I) as (M , I), where M is the basic causal model (S, F), if we want to emphasize the role of the allowed interventions.
Given a signature S = (U, V, R), a primitive event et al. (1996) , in that both are assignments of values to variables. However, here it is used in particular to denote an assignment of values to all the exogenous variables.
2 Halpern (2016) calls this strongly recursive, in order to distinguish it from models in which the partial order depends on the context. This distinction has no impact on our results. is a formula of the form X = x, for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X). A causal formula (over S) is one of the form A causal formula ψ is true or false in a causal model, given a context. As usual, we write (M, u) |= ψ if the causal formula ψ is true in causal model M given context u. The |= relation is defined inductively. (M, u) |= X = x if the variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with recursive models) solution to the equations in M in context u (i.e., the unique vector of values that simultaneously satisfies all equations in M with the variables in U set to u). The truth of conjunctions and negations is defined in the standard way. Finally,
To simplify notation, we sometimes write M ( u) to denote the unique element of
These definitions allow us to describe the climate system both in terms of a low-level causal model M L and a highlevel model M H :
Chalupka et al. (2016) treated U as not only exogenous, but also unobserved, and therefore made no claim about its dimensionality in the high-level model. We do not explicitly spell out R L and R H here; the description of the climate model indicates that We are now in a position to specify a relation between the high and low-level models M H and M L .
Abstraction
Beckers and Halpern (2019) gave a sequence of successively more restrictive definitions of abstraction for causal model. The first and least restrictive definition is the notion of exact transformation due to Rubenstein et al. (2017) . Examples given by Beckers and Halpern show that the notion of exact transformation is arguably too flexible. Thus, in this paper the notion of abstraction we consider is that of τ -abstractions, introduced by Beckers and Halpern, which can be viewed as a restriction of exact transformations 3 and avoids some of their problems. However, nothing hinges on this choice: all definitions can just as well be interpreted using the less restrictive notions of abstractions.
The key to defining all the notions of abstraction from a low-level to a high-level causal model considered by Beckers and Halpern is the abstraction func-
This is a generalization of the surjective mapping τ from R( T , W ) to R(E, C) discussed in the introduction. In the formal definition, we need two additional func-
, which maps exogenous states of M L to exogenous states of M H , and ω τ : I L → I H , which maps low-level interventions to high-level interventions. Beckers and Halpern (2019) show that, given their definition of abstraction, τ U and ω τ can be derived from τ . We briefly review the relevant definitions here; we refer the reader to their paper for more details and motivation. Definition 2.3: Given a set V of endogenous variables, X ⊆ V, and x ∈ R( X), let
It is easy to see that, given X and x, there can be at most one such Y and y. If such a Y and y do not exist, we take ω τ ( X ← x) to be undefined. Let I τ L be the set of interventions for which ω τ is defined, and let
Note that if τ is surjective, then it easily follows that
With this definition, the need for the intervention sets I L and I H becomes clear: in general, not all low-level 3 Exact τ -transformations relate probabilistic causal models, while τ -abstractions relate (deterministic) causal models. Beckers and Halpern (2019) show that we can compare the two by proving that every τ -abstraction is what they call a uniform τ -transformation: specifically, if MH is a τ -abstraction of ML, then for every probability PrL, there exists a probability PrH such that (ML, PrL) is an exact τ -transformation of (MH , PrH ).
interventions will neatly map to a high-level intervention, since the abstraction function τ may aggregate variables together; some low-level interventions will constitute only a partial intervention on a high-level variable. The "allowed intervention" sets ensure that the set of interventions can be suitably restricted to retain only those that can actually be abstracted. Similarly, there may be cases where the high-level model does not support all interventions because they may not be well-defined. For example, what does it mean in the ideal gas law to change temperature, while keeping pressure and volume constant? It is not even clear that such an intervention is meaningful.
Of course, a minimal requirement for any causal model to be a τ -abstraction of some other model is that the signatures of both models need to be compatible with τ . Beckers and Halpern (2019) add two further minimal requirements. We capture all of them by requiring the two causal models to be τ -consistent:
Abstraction means that for each possible low-level context-intervention pair, the two ways of moving up "diagonally" to a high-level endogenous state always lead to the same result. The first way is to start by applying M L to get a low-level state, and then moving up to a highlevel state by applying τ , whereas the second way is to first move to a high-level context and intervention (by applying τ U and ω τ ), and then to obtain a high-level state by applying M H .
A common and useful form of abstraction occurs when the low-level variables are clustered, so that the clusters form the high-level variables. Roughly speaking, the intuition is that in the high-level model, one variable captures the effect of a number of variables in the low-level model. This makes sense only if the low-level variables that are being clustered together "work the same way" as far as the allowed interventions go. The following definition makes this special case of abstraction precise.
. . , Z n are nonempty, and mappings 
, where z i is the projection of v L onto the variables in Z i , and · is the concatenation operator on sequences. If M H is a τ -abstraction of M L then we say it is constructive if τ is constructive and
In this definition, we can think of each Z i as describing a set of microvariables that are mapped to a single macrovariable Y i . The variables in Z n+1 (which might be empty) are ones that are marginalized away.
The climate example almost exactly fits the notion of constructive abstraction: the variables in the high-level model, C and E, each correspond to a vector-valued lowlevel variable, W and T , but W and T could have been replaced by disjoint sets of variables. Consequently, τ maps states from the same low-level variable to the same high-level variable (see Fig. 2, left) . Although interventions are practically not feasible in the climate case, hypothetically they are perfectly well-defined: an intervention on C can be instantiated at the low level by several different interventions on W (see Fig. 2, right) . Finally, given an intervention on W , we have that
The correspondence between M L and M H is exact. In fact, the high-level model M H constructed by Chalupka et al. (2016) did not satisfy this biconditional precisely, but had to approximate it. We maintain that, in general, high-level models in science are only approximate abstractions.
APPROXIMATE ABSTRACTION
In order to define what it means for one causal model to be an approximation of another, we need a way of measuring the "distance" between causal models. We take a distance function to simply be a function that associates with a pair (M 1 , M 2 ) a distance, that is, a non-negative real number. We show how various distance functions on causal models can be defined, starting from a metric d V on the state space R(V) of a causal model. (Recall that a metric on a space X is a function d : The choice of distance function is application-dependent. Different researchers looking at the same data may be interested in different aspects of the data. For example, suppose that the model is defined in terms of 5 variables, X 1 , . . . , X 5 .
X 3 might be gender and X 4 might be height.
Suppose that we restrict to distance functions that takes the distance between (x 1 , . . . , x 5 ) and (x 1 , ..., x 5 ) to be of the form w 1 (x 1 − x 1 ) 2 + · · · + w 5 (x 5 − x 5 ) 2 , where w 1 , . . . , w 5 are weights that represent the importance (to the researcher) of each of these five features. One researcher might not be interested in gender (so doesn't care if her predictions about gender are incorrect), and thus might take w 3 = 0; another researcher might care about gender and not about height, so she might take w 3 = 1 and w 4 = 0. While, as we shall see, the choice of distance function makes a crucial difference in evaluating the "goodness" of an approximate abstraction, in light of the above, we leave the choice of distance function unspecified.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the state space R(V) of endogenous variables for each causal model comes with a metric d V . We provide a number of ways of lifting the metric d V on states to a distance function d on models, and then use the distance function to define both approximation and approximate abstraction.
Our intuition for the distance function is based on how causal models are typically used. Specifically, we are interested in how two models compare with regard to the predictions they make about the effects of an intervention. Our intuition is similar in spirit to that behind the notion of structural intervention distance considered by Peters and Bühlmann (2015) , although the technical definitions are quite different. (We discuss the exact relationship between our approach and theirs in the next section, in the context of probabilistic models.)
We start with the simplest setting where this intuition can be made precise, one where the models M 1 and M 2 differ only with regards to their equations. We say that two models are similar in this case. If two models are similar, then, among other things, we can assume that they have the same metric d V . In this setting, we can compare the effect of each allowed intervention X ← x in the two models. That is, for each context u, we can compare the states M 1 ( u, X ← x) and M 2 ( u, X ← x) that arise after performing the intervention X ← x in context u in each model. We get the desired distance function by taking the worst-case distance between all such states.
Definition 3.1: Define a distance function d max on pairs of similar models by taking
Thus, M 1 is a d max -α approximation of M 2 if the predictions of M 1 are always within α of the predictions of M 2 .
We apply similar ideas to defining approximate abstraction. But now we no longer have a distance function defined on causal models with the same signature. Rather, the distance function d τ is defined on pairs (M L , M H ) consisting of a low-level and high-level causal model (which, in general, have different signatures), related by a a surjective mapping τ . The idea behind d τ is that we start with a low-level intervention X ← x, consider its effects in M L , lift this up to M H using τ , and compare this to the effects of
We take the minimum over all functions τ U because the function that lifts the low-level contexts up to the highlevel contexts does not play a major role. We thus simply focus on the best choice of τ U .
To get an intuition for an approximate abstraction, consider the climate example again. For a low-level intervention W ← w and a low-level context u, there are two ways of lifting their effect to M H (see Fig. 3 ). The first is to start by applying M L to the context-intervention pair to determine a low-level state t, and then apply τ to obtain the high-level state E = e = τ ( t). (Recall that M L can be viewed as a function from context-intervention pairs to states in R L (V L ).) The second is to first lift the intervention W ← w to I H , that is, an intervention on C, and the context to U H by applying ω τ and τ U . Then we apply M H ( u H , C ← c), which again gives a high-level endogenous state e . We are identifying the degree to which M H approximates M L with the worstcase distance between the two ways of lifting the contextintervention pairs, for an optimal choice of τ U .
The following straightforward results show that our notion of approximate abstraction is a sensible generalization of both the notion of an exact abstraction and the notion of approximation between similar models.
Proposition 3.4: If M 1 and M 2 are similar, then M 2 is a Id -α-approximate abstraction of M 1 (where Id is the identity function on R(V)) iff M 2 is a d max -α-approximation of M 1 .
APPROXIMATE ABSTRACTION FOR PROBABILISTIC CAUSAL MODELS
A probabilistic causal model M = (S, F, I, Pr) is just a causal model together with a probability Pr on contexts u. In this section, we assume that all causal models are probabilistic, and extend the notion of approximation to probabilistic causal models. We again start by considering the simplest setting, where we have probabilistic models that differ only in their equations. We again call such models similar. Now we have several reasonable distance functions.
Definition 4.1: Define a distance function d max on pairs of similar probabilistic causal models by taking
Here we have just replaced the max over contexts in Definition 3.1 by an expectation over contexts.
But we may not always just be interested in the expected distance. We may, for example, be more concerned with the likelihood of serious prediction differences, and not be too concerned about small differences. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.2: Define a distance function d β on pairs of similar probabilistic causal models by taking
We can now extend these ideas to approximate abstraction. We first extend the definition of τ -abstraction to the probabilistic setting.
Note that we can view Pr as a probability measure on R(V), by taking Pr( v) = { u : M ( u) = v}. An intervention X ← x also induces a probability Pr X← x on R(V) in the obvious way:
In the deterministic notion of abstraction, we require that the two high-level states obtained by the two different ways of lifting the effects of a low-level intervention to the high level be equal. In the probabilistic notion, we require that the two different probability distributions obtained by the two ways of lifting an intervention be equal.
We can now extend our definitions to the approximate scenario just as we did for deterministic causal models. 
For the climate example this definition implies the following: Suppose we introduce probabilities by specifying distributions over the contexts u L and u H . The resulting probabilistic causal model (M H , P r H ) is a τ -α approximate abstraction of (M L , P r L ) if the expectation (in terms of P r L ) of the difference between the states e and e of the high-level temperature variable E is less or equal to α, where e and e are determined exactly in accordance with the two pathways in Fig. 3 , selecting the worst-case intervention W ← w and the best case τ U .
Analogously to the deterministic case, we have the following straightforward results.
Proposition 4.6: If M 1 and M 2 are similar, then M 2 is a Id-α-approximate abstraction of
In Definition 4.4 we consider the worst-case low-level intervention to define the distance. In many cases, however, the whole point of an abstraction is to be able to exclude rare low-level boundary cases (e.g., when the ideal gas law is taken to refer only to equilibrium states). Moreover, often the actual manipulations that we can perform are known to us only at the high-level, because the low-level implementation of the intervention is unobservable to us. For example, in setting the room temperature to 70
• F we do not generally consider the instantiation of that intervention which superheats one corner of the room and freezes the rest such that the mean kinetic energy works out just right. As Spirtes and Scheines (2004) show, in the absence of any further information, such ambiguous manipulations can be quite problematic. Fortunately, often our knowledge of the mechanism of how a high-level intervention is implemented does give us significant probabilistic information. For example, we might know that the heater has a fan that circulates the air, most likely resulting in relatively uniform distributions of the kinetic energies of the particles.
We capture this information using what we call an intervention distribution.
Definition 4.7 :
Given a surjective map
We think of Pr I ( X ← x | Y ← y) as telling us how likely the high-level intervention Y ← y is to have been Figure 4 : Probabilistic approximate abstraction for the climate example: An intervention on the high-level wind variable C results, given the distribution over contexts u (omitted for clarity), in the red distribution over the highlevel temperature variable E. The intervention C ← c can be instantiated in the low-level wind map W in many ways, according to the intervention distribution P r I . Mapping the (manipulated) distribution over W using M L results in a distribution over the low-level temperature map T that combines uncertainty from P r I and P r U . Abstracting this distribution using τ to E results in the black distribution over E. M H is a probabilistic τ -α-approximate abstraction of M L if the distance between the expectations of these distributions is less than α. implemented by the low-level intervention X ← x.
Definition 4.8: Given a surjective map τ : R(V L ) → R(V H ) and an intervention-distribution Pr I , the distance function d
Pr I τ on pairs of τ -consistent probabilistic causal models is defined by taking
Intuitively, for each high-level intervention Y ← y, we take the expected distance between the two ways of lifting a low-level intervention to Y ← y. In computing the expectation, there are two sources of uncertainty: the likelihood of a given context (this is determined by Pr L ) and the likelihood on each low-level intervention that maps to Y ← y (this is given by Pr I (· | Y ← y)). Fig. 4 illustrates the point for the climate example.
We can also define d τ β and d τ,Pr I β in a manner completely analogous to Definition 4.2. We omit these definitions for reasons of space, but the details should be clear.
It is worth comparing our approach to other approaches to determining the distance between causal models. The more standard way to compare two causal models is to compare their causal graphs. The causal graph is a directed acyclic graph (dag) that has nodes labeled by variables; (the node labeled) X is an ancestor of (the node labeled) Y iff X ≺ Y . Dags have been compared using what is called the structural Hamming distance (SHD) (Acid and de Campos 2003) , where the SHD between G and H (which are assumed to have an identical set of nodes) is the number of pairs of nodes (i, j) on which G and H differ regarding the edge between i and j (either because one of one of them has an edge and the other does not, or the edges are oriented in different directions). As Peters and Bühlmann (2015) observe, the SHD misses out on some important information in causal networks. In particular, it does not really compare the effect of interventions. They want a notion of distance that takes this into account, as do we. However, they take into account the effect of interventions in a way much closer in spirit to SHD. Roughly speaking, in our language, given two similar causal models M 1 and M 2 , they count the number of pairs (X, Y ) of endogenous variables such that intervening on X leads to a different distribution over Y in M 1 and M 2 . More formally, let Pr Although SID does compare the predictions that two models make, it differs from our distance functions in several important respects. First, it compares just the effect of interventions on single variables, whereas we allow arbitrary interventions. We believe that it is important to consider arbitrary interventions, since sometimes variables act together, and it takes intervening on more than one variable to distinguish two models. Second, we are interested in how far apart two distributions are, not just the fact that they are different. Finally, we want a definition that applies to models that are not similar, since this is what we need for approximate abstraction.
COMPOSING ABSTRACTION AND APPROXIMATION
It can be useful to understand an approximate abstraction as the result of composing an approximation and an abstraction, in some order. For example, we can explain the ideal gas law in terms of thinking of frictionless elastic collisions between particles (this is an approximation to the truth) and then abstracting by replacing the kinetic energy of the particles by their temperature (a measure of average kinetic energy). Here we examine the extent to which an approximate abstraction can be viewed this way. We start with two easy results showing that if we compose an approximation and an abstraction in some order, then we do get an approximate abstraction.
In Proposition 5.1 we considered an abstraction followed by an approximation. Things change if we do things in the opposite order; that is, if we consider an approximation followed by an abstraction. For suppose that M L is a
The problem is that when assessing how good an abstraction M H is of M L , we are comparing two high-level states (using
.
While composing an approximation and an abstraction gives us an approximate abstraction, the following two examples show that we cannot in general decompose an approximate abstraction into an abstraction composed with an approximation or an approximation composed with an abstraction. Theorem 5.6 below shows that if we restrict ourselves to the constructive case then we can do the former. However, Example 5.4 shows that, even if we restrict to the constructive case, we cannot do the latter.
Example 5.3: M L has one exogenous variable U and endogenous variables A, B, and C. M H also has one exogenous variable U and endogenous variables D and E. All the endogenous variables have range {0, 1}; U has range {0}. Let τ : R(V L ) → R(V H ) be τ (a, b, c) = (a⊕b, b⊕c), where ⊕ denotes addition mod 2. The equations for both M L and M H take the form V = U for all variables V . I L consists of the empty intervention, and interventions B ← 1, B ← 0, A ← 1, and A ← 0. I H consists of only the empty intervention. Taking as d V H the Euclidean distance, we leave it to the reader to ver-
To see why, note that the only state in M H that arises from applying an intervention is (0, 0). Therefore, the only states in M L that can arise from interventions are ones where a ⊕ b = 0 and b ⊕ c = 0. This means that under the intervention B ← 0, we must have A = 0, and under B ← 1, we must have A = 1. Therefore B ≺ A. It also means that under A ← 1 we must have B = 1 and under A ← 0 we must have B = 0, so that A ≺ B. Thus, M H cannot be recursive.
, 1} for i = 1, 2, 3, the equations are X 1 = U , X 2 = X 1 , and X 3 = X 2 , and I L consists of all interventions such that X 1 is intervened on iff X 3 is intervened on. Let M H be the model where
, the first component of Y 1 , and I H consists of all interventions. Let P = {{X 1 , X 3 }, {X 2 }}, and τ is such that τ (
As the following result shows, we can test whether an approximate abstraction can be viewed as the result of composing an abstraction and an approximation.
There is one important special case where we are guaranteed to be able to find an appropriate intermediate lowlevel model, and to do so in polynomial time: if the mapping τ is constructive.
As noted earlier, Example 5.4 shows that τ being constructive does not similarly guarantee the existence of M H in the first half of Theorem 5.5.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
By defining notions of abstraction, approximation, and approximate abstraction, we have presented a framework that relates causal models that describe the same system at (possibly) different levels of granularity. While coarser models offer a degree of simplification by omitting details, they also in general entail a loss in accuracy with respect to the fundamental description. Our framework shows how to quantify this loss in accuracy by defining a distance metric that captures the degree to which a more abstract causal model approximates a more detailed causal model. High-and low-level causal models of the same system can vary on almost any dimension. They need not share the same equations, the same variables, or the same interventions. They may involve entirely distinct state spaces. Inevitably, then, there is some degree of choice as to what one deems relevant to the approximation.
Starting with deterministic causal models, we provided a general method for quantifying the "goodness" of an approximate abstraction. As an interesting special case, our approach allows for the comparison of causal models that operate at the same level of detail. We then extended to probabilistic causal models, and considered several different choices for quantifying the distance between models. Finally, we considered the extent to which we could decompose an approximate abstraction into an abstraction and an approximation.
Given the ubiquitous use of causal models in the social and natural sciences that are known not to capture all the causally relevant details, the framework we presented offers a principled way to assess the trade-off between abstraction and accuracy.
Appendix: Proofs
In this appendix, we prove all the results not proved in the main text. We repeat the statements of the results for the reader's convenience
By the definition of k, we have
To make our results more general, we use the more general interpretation of recursiveness as it appears in (Halpern 2016) . Concretely, this means that the partial order on the endogenous variables may depend on the context. We write u for the partial order that exists for context u. (See footnote 2.)
and U L and I L are finite, then the problem of determining whether there exists a model
Proof: We start with the problem of determining M H . Since U H and U L are finite, there are only finitely many possible surjections from U L to U H . A surjection τ U is potentially high-level compatible with τ if
and not in the other.
We claim that τ U is potentially high-level compatible with τ iff there exists a (recursive) causal model PC1 . For all X ← x, X ← x ∈ I L and all u, u ∈ R L (U L ), if ω τ ( X ← x) = ω τ ( X ← x ) and
, there exists a partial order ≺ u L on the variables in V L such that for all interventions X ← x and X ← x in I L , and all variables Y ∈ V L whose value differs in f ( u L , X ← x) and f ( u L , X u L Y and either Z gets different values in X ← x and X ← x or Z is assigned a value in one of X ← x and X ← x and not in the other.
Essentially, f ( u L , X ← x) is playing the same role in PC2 as M L ( u L , X ← x) played in PC2.
We now claim that τ U : R L (V L ) → R H (V H ) and f : R(U L )×I L → R(V L ) are potentially low-level compatible with τ iff there exists a (recursive) causal model (M L , I L ) such that for all contexts u L ∈ R L (U L ) and interventions X ← x ∈ I L , we have M L ( u L , X ← x)) = f ( u L , X ← x)) and
The argument is almost identical to that given above for the first part, so we omit it here.
Thus, to determine whether there exists an appropriate model (M L , I L ), we simply need to guess f , τ U , and ≺ u L for all u L ∈ R L (U L ) and verify that PC1 and PC2 hold. 
Proof: Whereas in the proof of the second half in Theorem 5.5 we had to guess τ U and f , here we can construct them efficiently. Indeed, we can take τ U to be an arbitrary surjection from U L to U H .
To define f , suppose that V H = {Y 1 , . . . , Y n } and P τ = { Z 1 , . . . , Z n+1 } is the partition that makes τ constructive (as in Definition 2.6).
In constructing f ( u L , X ← x), we split the intervention X ← x into two parts: an intervention on variables in Z 1 ∪ . . . ∪ Z n and an intervention on variables in Z n+1 . How f works in the former case is determined by translating the intervention to M H . Interventions on variables in Z n+1 are treated specially. An intervention V ← v on a variable V ∈ Z n+1 just sets V to v, and does not affect any other variables. In more detail, we proceed as follows.
Note that τ is also a surjection from R L ( Z 1 ∪ . . . ∪ Z n ) to R H (V H ), since the variables in Z n+1 are ignored by τ . Thus, there is a right inverse τ −1 : R H (V H ) → R L ( Z 1 ∪ . . . cup Z n ) (so that τ • τ −1 is the identity function on R H (V H )). There are, in general, many such left inverses, but given τ , we can find a left inverse in time polynomial |R(U L )|.
Fix a setting z

